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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 7330
This paper is a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at gtimilsina@worldbank.org.  
It has been more than two decades since the widespread 
initiation of global power sector reforms and restructuring. 
However, empirical evidence on the intended microeco-
nomic, macroeconomic, and quality-related impacts of 
reforms across developing countries is lacking. This paper 
comprehensively reviews the empirical and theoretical 
literature on the linkages between power sector reforms, 
economic and technical efficiency, and poverty reduc-
tion. The review finds that the extent of power sector 
reforms has varied across developing countries in terms 
of changes in market structures, the role of the state, and 
the regulation of the sector. Overall, the reforms have 
improved the efficiency and productivity in the sector 
among many reforming countries. However, the efficiency 
gains have not always reached the end consumers because 
of the inability of sector regulators and inadequate regula-
tory frameworks. Reforms alleviate poverty and promote 
the welfare of the poor only when the poor have access to 
electricity. From a policy-making perspective, this implies 
that the reforms need to be supplemented with additional 
measures for accelerating electrification to help the poor. 
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1. Introduction 
Electricity sectors across the globe have experienced a major experiment of introducing 
market-oriented reforms and restructuring in response to a combination of political, 
ideological, economic and technological factors starting in the early 1980s and gaining pace 
since the 1990s. The reforms aimed at introducing energy policies, legislation, regulations and 
institutions that would dismantle the monopoly of state-owned utilities and provide 
opportunities for private actors to participate in a competitive market (Ljung, 2007). Moreover, 
market driven economic reforms are ongoing in many countries although the pace of the reform 
process has varied across countries. For example, by the end of the 1990s, the majority of 
OECD countries and over 70 developing and transition countries had taken some steps toward 
reforming their electricity sector through high and low level measures (Besant-Jones, 2006). 
The high level reform measures focussed on introducing competition in the wholesale and retail 
segments of energy supply, the horizontal unbundling of the incumbents to create viable 
competitors, the creation of an independent regulatory body and often (but not necessarily 
always) privatization. These measures allowed the corporatization of the different segments of 
the energy supply and also facilitated the vertical separation between the natural monopolies 
and the potentially competitive segments of the vertically integrated energy sectors that were 
monolithically owned and managed by state governments before reforms. Vertical separation 
of these distinct activities of the energy supply industry (ESI) was believed to guard against 
cross-subsidization between the competitive businesses and regulated businesses of energy 
supply and discriminatory practices such as denial of access to networks (Joskow, 2006). The 
degree of vertical separation (or unbundling) varied in terms of functional separation, 
accounting separation, legal separation and ownership separation. The low level reform 
measures included aspects of cost-reflective pricing (such as removal of subsidies and subsidies 
restructuring, tariff liberalisation and price setting), adoption of new energy technology, new 
financial schemes and community involvement (Prasad, 2008).  
Thus, a successful electricity reform is expected to enhance the efficiency of the sector, 
improve energy service reliability and service quality, reduce the price-cost gap through cost-
reflective pricing and increase investments (Newbery, 2002; Jamasb, 2006; Kessides, 2012). 
Successful power sector reform were expected to benefit the poor by providing access to energy 
services, improvements in cost efficiency, improvements in other services such as health, 
education and communications; and stimulation of economic development and improvements 
in public sector finances (Davies et al., 2003). A key question is the extent to which these goals 
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have been achieved considering that ample amounts of financial resources and effort have 
already been used in the reforming countries.  
Answering this question requires revisiting the theoretical rationale and examining the 
empirical evidence of power sector reforms against their anticipated objectives. However, a 
comprehensive analysis of the impacts of power sector reforms on several sector specific and 
macroeconomic dimensions including energy prices, energy supply quality, utility 
performance, economic growth, social welfare and poverty reduction is missing in the existing 
energy reform literature. On the other hand, there has been a renewed interest in the 
relationships between power sector reforms, efficiency, growth, and welfare in the light of 
climate change and energy security concerns (Nepal and Jamasb, 2015). For example, the UK, 
one of the pioneers of market-based reforms, proposed a new electricity market reform in 2010 
signalling the desire for more government intervention in order to meet its ambitious climate 
change objectives (DECC, 2011). The renationalization of electricity industries in Latin 
American countries such as Bolivia, República Bolivariana de Venezuela and the Dominican 
Republic has underscored the changing but significant role of the state in market-based reforms 
(Balza et al., 2013). For example, Argentina, once at the forefront of reform, is now curbing 
the role of markets in the energy sector (Littlechild, 2013).  
Nearly 30 years since the first power sector reform in Chile, it is timely to take stock of the 
cumulative reform experience with market-based reforms of this important and ongoing 
experiment. The reforms have proven much more difficult than first anticipated and most 
remain work in progress. This paper also attempts to close the gaps in the electricity reform 
literature by reviewing the process and micro-macro outcomes of power sector liberalisation 
and reform and synthesizes relevant policy lessons for policymakers in (re) formulating the 
(existing) new power sector reforms and policies. An earlier study by Jamasb et al. (2005) 
reviewed empirical evidence on electricity reform in developing countries by focussing on the 
operating efficiency and electricity access impacts. However, we have considered both 
empirical and theoretical literature on the linkages between electricity sector reforms; 
economic and technical efficiency, economic growth, welfare and poverty reduction in 
developing countries. In doing so, this paper aims to measure reform performance, clearly 
explore the link between the theory and practice of electricity reforms filling an important gap 
in the existing literature and reach rigid conclusions on the performance of reforms from a 
policymaking perspective. We do not examine the impact of reforms on the environment. It 
suffices to state that reforms may or may not have negative environmental impacts. However, 
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this is rather a matter of devising proper environmental policies and is, therefore, separate from 
the reforms per se.1  
The remainder of the sections are structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on the 
drives, context and status of electricity reforms around the world.  Section 3 discusses the 
different methodological approaches to studying the impacts of reforms and analyse the 
impacts of energy sector reforms on several industry specific and macroeconomic dimensions. 
Section 4 synthesizes the insights from the reforms and policy lessons. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Overview: Drivers, Context and Status of Reforms  
Electricity sector reforms based on the ‘standard textbook model’ became a global trend during 
the 1990s. The textbook model was first applied in the Chilean power sector in 1982 and also 
became the reference model for reforms in other energy sectors. The textbook model for 
reforms involved the following reform sequence and steps: i) corporatization of state-owned 
enterprise, ii) law for electricity sector liberalization, iii) establishment of an independent 
regulator, iv) unbundling (vertical separation) of the main segments, v) incentive regulation of 
electricity networks, vi) establishment of a wholesale electricity market, vii) privatization and 
viii) introduction of independent power producers (IPPs). The model brought about a 
fundamental paradigm shift in terms of electricity sector market structures, the role of the state, 
and the regulation of the sector (Joskow, 1998; Newbery, 2002). 
The structures of electricity markets have a strong influence on whether and the extent to which 
reforms can achieve improvements in performance. Creating competitive wholesale and retail 
electricity markets by undertaking vertical separation were the eventual underlying aims behind 
market restructuring. Competition inevitably meant a reduction in state ownership, as private 
sector could freely participate in wholesale markets and take market share from incumbents 
(Pollitt, 2012). The reforms were aimed at expanding the scope for competition in the 
electricity sector either through ‘competition in the market’ or ‘competition for the market’ 
(Ljung, 2007). Hence, both domestic private firms and multinational corporations could 
participate as market actors. As a result, there was a strong push for privatisation and models 
                                                            
1 A notable study by ESMAP (2011) shows that vertical unbundling tends to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 
5 percent indicating a higher degree of environmental sustainability. 
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of private sector participation such as the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the 
electricity sector (Vagliasindi, 2013).  
The market-oriented reforms were followed by the need to create strong and effective new 
institutions in the form of independent electricity sector regulatory agencies. The separation of 
the natural monopoly segments of electricity supply from the competitive segments and 
privatisation placed much emphasis on economic regulation to ensure that public interests were 
properly reflected in terms of service quality, network access and tariffs while all generators 
had equitable access to the grid and consumers. The perverse incentives created by the cost-of-
service regulation in terms gold-plated spending (see Averch and Johnson, 1962) implied that 
incentive regulation was encouraged to improve cost efficiency in electricity networks. It was 
assumed that incentive regulation of the monopoly electricity networks would mimic the 
outcomes of a competitive market (Littlechild, 1992). 
Table 1 summarizes the drivers that contributed to the adoption of liberalised electricity 
reforms in developed and developing countries. The specific motives for reforms often varied 
between developing and developed countries while external drivers (factors outside the sector) 
played a key role in shaping electricity sector reforms. Poor operational and financial 
performance of the state led utilities; technological progress and development of the highly 
efficient gas-fired combined coal gas turbines (CCGTs); political faith on the forces of market, 
competition and privatization; pressures from international donor agencies; options for raising 
capital to the government and alongside reducing its Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR) were some of the major drivers of reforms (see Jamasb, Nepal, Timilsina and Toman, 
2014).2  
 
                                                            
2 For example, the World Bank officially changed its lending policy in 1992 and later followed by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) for electricity development from traditional project lending to policy 
lending. Almost $US 187 billion of private capital flowed into the economy of 76 developing countries during the 
1990s (Beder, 2005). Privatization of state owned energy utilities reinforced the ideology of the Thatcher 
government and its interest in reducing the costs of domestic coal subsidies in the UK while similar ideological 
and political explanations can be found in Chile, Norway and New Zealand (Newbery, 2002; Hogan, 2002). 
Technological progress eliminated the significant entry barriers that had previously existed to entry in power 
generation and intensified competition in electricity generation. Likewise, Bolivia including other Latin American 
countries (LACs), Ghana and the transition economies (which includes the countries belonging to the former 
Soviet Union) are examples of energy sector privatization in the context of large debt crisis. Interestingly, 
privatisation in the LACs proceeded at such a speed that they contributed to about 40% of the total value of energy 
privatizations in the world during the 1990s (Gabriele, 2004). 
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Table 1: Drivers of electricity sector reforms 
Electricity sector drivers External drivers 
 
Developed countries:  
excess capacity, use of costly generation 
technologies, economic inefficiency, 
growing consumer demands for cheap 
energy 
 
Developing countries: 
Lack of public sector financial resources 
to meet growing demand, institutional 
inefficiency, burden of energy subsidies, 
low service quality, high energy losses, 
poor service coverage, capacity shortage 
and energy sector investment constraints   
 
a) Political and economic ideology: faith on the 
forces of market, competition and privatization 
b) Technological innovation: such as the 
development of CCGTs 
c) Macroeconomic events: such as the post-Soviet 
economic transition (1989), Latin American debt 
crisis (1980s), Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) 
d) Capital raising options: privatization of state 
owned energy assets 
e) OECD energy deregulation: creation of new 
energy multinationals looking for new investment 
opportunities 
f) Lending policies of donors: such as those of the 
World Bank and IMF with strings attached 
g) National economic reform context: as a result of 
economic crisis and structural adjustment 
programs 
 
 
However, the sector’s resource endowment, initial structure, size, and institutional strength 
differed across the reforming countries. Also, the design, scope, and implementation of reforms 
varied across countries. Inevitably, these factors came to play an important role in the extent 
of adoption and performance of market-oriented reforms. These conditions proved critical in 
determining the appropriate design and pace of sector reform for a country (World Bank, 2004). 
The initial sector structure defines the starting point of the reform process and is a given factor 
implying the importance of envisaging appropriate structure from the start of the reform 
process. The institutional factors refer to sector and economy level legal and regulatory 
framework that influence and support the continuity of the electricity sector reform process. 
The reforms and regulation of the electricity sector in developing countries tend to suffer from 
low levels of institutional environment in terms of limited regulatory capacity, limited 
accountability, limited commitment and limited fiscal efficiency (Laffont, 2005). The weak 
institutional environment implies that reforms and regulation of the sector can be ineffective. 
Regulation (predominantly cost-based) can also be prone to political capture and becoming a 
tool of self-interest within the government or ruling elite in developing countries (Stiglitz, 
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1998). However, regulation by contract or a combination of regulation by contract and 
regulatory independence may provide a better regulatory framework for developing countries 
aiming to privatize their distribution systems (Bakovic, Tenenbaum, and Woolf, 2003). The 
size of the electricity sector can influence the reform capabilities and reform options of 
individual reforming countries. It is not clear if the smaller energy systems in developing 
countries require or benefit from vertical separation and third-party access. For example, the 
scope for competition may be limited implying that, in small energy systems; the benefits of 
liberalization and reforms may be small in relation to the costs.  
Despite these notable differences, electricity sector reforms have been globally pursued under 
varying initial conditions. Some have had relative success while many have not lived up to the 
ambitions and expectations after more than two decades of reforms. For example, existing 
market driven reforms among OECD countries like Chile, Norway and Sweden appears to be 
performing well as compared to the UK, once considered as a successful model of electricity 
reforms. In contrast, the inability to attract private investments in the power sector in Sub-
Saharan African countries like Uganda and Zambia remains a disappointment. According to 
the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database, there was a boom in IPPs 
during the 1990s, which subsequently abated with the arrival of the financial crisis in the late 
1990s.  
 
Reforms seem to have failed to correct the chronic underinvestment in power supply in most 
developing and transition countries, which also accounts for the poor performance of the sector 
in these countries. For example, there was very little investment in the power sector from 1991 
to at least the mid-2000s except for the Russian Federation and Turkey in the European and 
Central Asian countries (Barbara, 2010). Some countries (such as in Latin America) have made 
relatively advanced transition to the market in the energy sector while some (such as China, 
Russia, South Africa) are caught between the state and the market where the state still plays a 
dominant role in electricity sector operation and management (Nepal, 2013). Table 2 
summarizes the power sector reform experience among selected cases in a power sector reform 
matrix.  
 
 
 
8 
 
Table 2: Reform status of electricity sector in selected countries  
Country Primary 
factors for 
reform 
Key milestones of 
the reform process 
Main outcomes Limitation/ 
Challenges 
India economic 
openness to 
foreign 
investment, 
poor 
performance of 
state-owned 
electric utilities 
IPP entry in 1991, 
introduction of 
independent 
regulation act (at 
state level) was 
passed in 1998, 
Electricity Reform 
Act enacted in 
2003 
all states (29) have 
constituted and operated an 
independent regulator 
while 23 states have 
undertaken tariff reform, 
20 states have implemented 
unbundling/corporatization, 
2 states (Orissa and Delhi) 
have  privatised 
distribution, 28 states have 
implemented third party 
access and 11 states have 
exercised multi-year 
distribution tariff orders  
success of 
reform not 
encouraging, 
questionable 
outcomes base d 
on competition 
and 
privatisation, 
technical losses 
above 35% of 
power 
generation, 
power theft on-
going, state-
level corruption, 
subsidised 
tariffs 
Thailand supply 
shortages, 
government’s 
massive debt, 
Asian financial 
crisis 
1992 Electricity 
Law, IPP Law 
1996, approval of 
independent 
regulator 
establishment in 
1999, 
abandonment of 
price based pool in 
2003, privatisation 
postponement in 
2004, 
establishment of 
energy regulatory 
board in 2008 
electricity market reforms 
remain inactive, 
uneconomic tariff structure 
which is disadvantageous 
to consumers, regulation ad 
incentive schemes do not 
promote efficiency but 
favour the state enterprises  
political turmoil 
affecting reform 
implementation, 
regulatory 
institutions 
remain weak 
and not 
independent, 
state enterprises 
are favoured, 
promoting 
market 
competition 
difficult 
Ghana supply 
shortages, 
external 
lending policy, 
fiscal crisis, 
lack of 
investment, 
poorly 
performing 
distribution 
sector 
World Bank 
requires reform as 
loan conditions in 
1994, 1997 
restructuring and 
privatization plan, 
regulator formed, 
IPPs introduced in 
1998, reforms 
shelved by 
parliament in 2001, 
Volta River 
Authority (VRA) 
unbundled in 2008 
reforms stalled, structure of 
the sector has not changed 
much, VRA mostly 
operating under financial 
losses, distribution losses 
remain high, tariff setting 
not economic and eroding 
the long term viability of 
utilities  
regulator not 
independent 
from political 
interference, no 
standard form of 
PPA in the 
market, 
competing 
pressures to 
keep consumer 
tariffs low 
hampering the 
establishment of 
cost-reflective 
tariff 
Fiji fiscal 
problems, 
1996 Public 
Enterprise Act, 
functional 
productivity improvements, 
system losses reduced from 
18% to 10%, tariff 
regulator unable 
to make 
independent 
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donors lending 
policy 
separation in 1998, 
internal reform 
again started in 
2002, tariffs 
increase by 
independent 
regulator in 2005  
collection rates increased, 
more authority and 
discretion to independent 
regulators 
decisions on 
tariff setting,,, 
unstable 
political 
environment can 
lead to low 
private sector 
involvement 
Brazil poor  
performance of 
state-owned 
utilities, 
demonstrations 
effects from 
Chile and 
Argentina   
launched radical 
electricity sector 
reforms in 1996, 
privatisation began 
in 1995, creation of 
independent 
regulators in 1998, 
short term 
wholesale market 
created between 
1995 and 2003, 
long term contracts 
model replaced the 
previous wholesale 
market between 
2004 and 2005 
increasing reverting to 
central planning, 
competition has improved 
in the sector, auction 
process in transmission 
provide competition and 
incentives for investors, 
distribution companies 
procure electricity at 
competitive price  
excessive 
reliance on 
hydro can lead 
to energy crisis 
in the face of 
rising demand as 
in 2001-2002, 
decarbonisation 
a challenge 
when addressing 
issues associated 
with security of 
supply and 
diversity in 
generation, 
attracting 
private 
investments a 
necessary 
condition for the 
growth of the 
sector 
China electricity 
reforms 
pursued as a 
part of wider 
liberal 
economic 
reforms 
corporatisation and 
commercialisation 
of sector in 1998, 
1999 bidding by 
power generators, 
separation of 
generation from 
transmission and 
distribution in 
2002, creation of 
state electricity 
regulatory 
commission in 
2002, scheme for 
power price reform 
in 2003  
overall reforms postponed, 
industry restructuring not 
accompanied by the 
introduction of competitive 
markets, entrenched 
interests have obstructed 
further reform, generating 
capacity doubled between 
2002 and 2007 
future of power 
sector reform 
uncertain, 
political will be 
important in 
moving forward 
with stalled 
reforms, 
institutions such 
as legal system 
and capital 
markets remain 
immature to 
support 
competitive 
markets 
Russia electricity 
reforms 
pursued as a 
part of wider 
liberal 
economic 
reforms after 
establishment of 
joint stock 
company for 
electricity in 1992, 
reform principles 
adopted in 2001, 
regulatory 
framework of the 
reforms stalled, lack of 
insufficient investments for 
system modernization and 
low carbon generation 
capacity, electricity pricing 
controlled by government 
for social equity concerns 
blackouts in 
2002 
highlighted 
fragility of the 
system, 
destruction of 
hydropower 
plant in 2008 
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Soviet-Union 
break up 
reform established 
in 2003, gradual 
transition towards 
free market pricing 
in 2003, 
privatisation of 
quasi- monopolist 
in 2008, free 
market pricing in 
theory in 2011  
highlighted the 
need for system 
modernisation, 
market pricing 
only in theory as 
government 
actively 
monitors 
electricity prices 
South 
Africa 
democratic 
revolution of 
1994, poor 
performance of 
state-owned 
utilities, new 
international 
thinking 
creation of an 
independent 
regulator in 1995, 
White Paper on 
Energy Policy 
published in 1998, 
announcement of 
no unbundling of 
the incumbent in 
2004, White Paper 
on renewable 
energy published 
in 2003 
overall reluctance to 
reform, post 1990 
performance saw some 
improvements in quality 
and security of supply, 
rapid progress in extending 
electricity access, prices 
still low by international 
standards and below cost-
recovery levels 
urgent need for 
capacity 
expansion as 
capacity is tight, 
pricing 
principles of 
efficiency and 
cost-reflectivity 
necessary, 
transparency in 
subsidy 
programme 
needed   
 
 
The single-buyer model dominates most of the electricity sectors in Asia, Africa and some 
transition countries as observed in Table 3. The single buyer model is perceived to be a 
reasonable second-best solution in countries where the competitive model would not work 
(Arizu, Gencer and Maurer, 2006). In contrast, most of the countries in Latin America have 
competitive wholesale arrangements and considerable reforms have been carried out with 
adherence to the standard reform model. The generation segment of the ESI has undergone 
privatization in many developing countries while the network segments remain publicly 
owned. The privatisation of the ESI has been largely pursued in Latin America while IPPs now 
occupy a large market in Asia, particularly in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, 
Malaysia and Thailand under a single-buyer model. Overall, many developing countries are 
still some distance away from the full adoption of liberalized standard model in their power 
sector and are by and large in transition from state control to markets.  
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Table 3: Power Sector Reform Matrix 
Market Structure 
Private Ownership and 
Involvement 
Regulation 
China, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka,  Burkina Faso, 
Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Zimbabwe, Senegal, 
Morocco, Tunisia 
m
on
ol
ith
ic
 si
ng
le
 b
uy
er
 
China, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Nepal, 
Lithuania, Turkey, 
Russia, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Bolivia, 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru, Chile, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Uganda, 
Nigeria, Ghana, 
Cameroon, 
Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, India, Pakistan 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Thailand, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal  
Cameroon, Nigeria, 
Uganda, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Senegal, 
Kenya, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, Peru, 
Brazil, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Russia, 
Turkey, Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t r
eg
ul
at
or
s  
ex
ist
s 
Malaysia, Philippines, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Ghana, Uganda, 
Kenya, Turkey, 
Lithuania 
un
bu
nd
le
d 
si
ng
le
 
bu
ye
r 
Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Peru, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Russia, 
Lithuania tr
an
sm
iss
io
n 
Korea Rep., 
Cameroon, 
Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, 
Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan 
m
on
op
ol
y 
Philippines, Pakistan, 
Cameroon, Uganda, 
Côte d’Ivoire, 
Morocco, Chile, 
Brazil, Peru, 
Argentina, Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, Colombia, 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n 
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Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, 
Nicaragua, Russia wh
ol
es
al
e 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
Russia, Lithuania, 
Turkey, Azerbaijan 
Source: Ljung (2007) and authors' compilation 
 
3. Assessing the Reform Impacts  
Several approaches have been used in the literature to assess impacts of energy sector, 
particularly, power sector reforms. These include social cost-benefit analysis, econometric 
analysis, efficiency and productivity analysis, macroeconomic analysis and specific case 
studies.  
A social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) in principle considers energy reforms and restructuring 
as an investment and compares the costs of investment with the benefit which is the change in 
actual and projected performance relative to a defined counterfactual of what would have 
happened in the absence of reforms and restructuring (Jones et al., 1990). Hence, a SCBA is 
expected to estimate the overall welfare impact of energy sector reforms and the distribution 
of welfare. However, governments do not necessarily perform social-cost benefit analysis prior 
to reform and tend to rely on less formal types of assessment (Jamasb, Newbery and Pollitt, 
2005). Moreover, energy sector reforms are multi-dimensional activities with many interacting 
factors, which cannot be captured by a SCBA.  
Econometric analysis is used to test hypothesis through statistical analysis of reform 
determinants and performance thereby quantifying the effect of various reforms on the energy 
sector performance indicators. Performance metric regressions based on cross-section, panel 
data econometrics and time-series econometrics are applied for this purpose. Statistical tests to 
assess the significant differences in the performance metrics before and after reforms are often 
carried out by conducting a t-test. However, a t-test for significant performance differences 
cannot control for the effects of other variables as in a multivariable regression analysis.  
Efficiency and productivity analyses are desirable for assessing the effectiveness to transform 
inputs into outputs, relative to best practice. Both parametric and non-parametric methods are 
used in measuring productivity and efficiency. Parametric methods use specified production or 
cost functional forms and apply econometric techniques. Typical parametric methods include 
regression analysis and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). In contrary, non-parametric methods 
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use mathematical programming techniques and do not require specification of production or 
cost functions. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a commonly used non-parametric method 
that evaluates the performance of an agent relative to the frontier. Frontier methodologies 
measure efficiency as the distance to the frontier by constructing a cost or production function. 
Therefore, each individual agent is benchmarked against the best practice, also known as 
benchmarking (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2000). Efficiency and productivity analysis also reduce the 
need for rigorous data and especially when the data are hard to collect.  
Macroeconomic analysis use macroeconomic models, such as computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models to assess the quantitative impacts of energy reforms on the economy. The CGE 
models use actual economic data to estimate how an economy might react to changes in policy, 
technology or other external factors pertaining to energy reforms. The advantage of the reform 
studies based on CGE modelling is that these studies attempt to model the interaction effects 
of sector reform with non-reforming sectors and calculate the aggregate welfare effect directly.  
Single or multi-country case studies are desirable when in-depth investigation or qualitative 
analysis is needed. These studies are useful when qualitative aspects of reforms such as 
regulation and conflict resolution and reform dynamics such as the implementation process are 
crucial factors in assessing the efficacy of the reforms (Jamasb et al., 2005). This is because 
these factors are inherently difficult to capture through statistical methods. Case studies can 
examine issues that do not easily lend themselves to rigorous quantitative analysis or could not 
be analysed due to a lack of comprehensive data (Jamasb, Newbery and Pollitt, 2005). Hence, 
case studies can overcome the issues associated with model specification and accuracy of 
variables in representing the relevant aspect of reform. Case studies involving single or 
multiple countries have been a popular technique to study the process and outcomes of energy 
sector reforms in many developing and developed countries.  
Market-oriented electricity reforms, when implemented properly, should engender positive 
impacts on efficiency and other performance measures of the energy industry with desirable 
macroeconomic consequences. Reforms are expected to lead to cost-reflective energy pricing 
and the curtailment of energy subsidies while reducing the margins between price and cost (i.e. 
reducing the scope for market power abuse and exercise). Reforms should also enhance the 
technical, operational (including improved access to energy) and economic efficiency of the 
sector. The importance of energy as a production input and necessary final consumption good 
imply that energy reforms should be conducive towards economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Hence, the impacts of energy sector reforms can be studied as industry specific 
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impacts (encompassing energy prices/subsidies and technical/economic/operational 
efficiency) and macroeconomic impacts (economic growth, poverty reduction, welfare 
enhancement). 
 
3.1. Microeconomic Impacts of Electricity Sector Reforms 
This section reviews the relevant literature analyzing the impacts of energy sector reforms on 
several dimensions pertaining to the microeconomics of electricity industry including 
electricity pricing, economic efficiency and electricity service quality (e.g., reliability). As 
energy sector reforms are market-driven they rely on competition and price signals, reforms 
are expected to lower electricity costs and retail prices while improving the overall efficiency 
of the sector (Joskow, 1998). It is noteworthy that in developing countries removal of subsidies, 
a source of inefficiency, will result in increased prices. In this section we present evidence of 
meeting (or not meeting) this objective of the energy sector reforms.  
 
3.1.1. Impacts of reforms on electricity pricing 
Electricity reforms are expected to establish the primacy of pricing mechanism in the electricity 
industry by fostering competition and leading to improved efficiency and lower energy prices 
(Yang and Sharma, 2012). Reforms would encourage entry of new actors in energy markets by 
providing better incentives so that new entrants with more efficient technologies would create 
downward pressure on energy prices (Fan, 2007). Hence, sector reforms are expected to lead 
to lower electricity price-cost margins cost-reflective pricing move electricity prices towards 
their long-run marginal costs (LRMC). 
However, there is no clear consensus regarding the evidence of reforms on energy price impacts 
in developing countries. The global evidence suggests that privatisation did not lower costs in 
the short run for the industry once allowance was made for ownership while government 
interference with investments decisions led to increased costs (Pollitt, 1995). Moreover, the 
evidence varies across different developing regions while the impacts of different reform steps 
on energy prices also differ. Three studies by Nagayama (2007; 2009) and Erdogdu (2011) are 
of notable importance in assessing the reform impacts on prices at the global level. For 
example, Nagayama (2007) show that the introduction of foreign IPPs, privatization and 
introducing retail competition lowered electricity prices in some regions and not all developing 
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countries they studied. Regulatory institutions in developing countries are often found to be 
not independent implying that political interference prevents energy prices from being-cost 
reflective. Country level corruption on contracts granted to the IPPs also prevented the reforms 
from producing their intended effects in developing countries such as in Southeast Asia (Henisz 
and Zelner, 2002). On the other hand, a study by ESMAP (2011) shows that vertical unbundling 
decreased electricity tariffs by 10% indicating a higher degree of competitiveness in developing 
countries. 
Nagayama (2009) shows that cross-subsidies in electricity pricing declined with the progress 
in the electricity sector liberalization in Asian developing countries although liberalization 
models do not necessarily reduce average electricity prices. In Latin America, the impact of 
liberalization on electricity prices is mixed. The wholesale and retail prices have often risen 
due to unbundling and privatization in order to assure return in investment expected by private 
investors.  
The effects of reforms on electricity price cost-margin (i.e. the difference between electricity 
price and cost) and cross subsidy levels can be different between industrial and residential 
consumers across both developing and developed countries. Participation of IPPs in the 
generation market and existence of wholesale markets seems to decrease industrial price-cost 
margin in Latin American countries (Erdogdu, 2011). Likewise, the establishment of wholesale 
electricity markets and a market regulator had a downward effect on the residential price-cost 
margins in developing countries. Unbundling an inherent element of the textbook reform 
model), with privatization, also led to a decreasing effect on residential price-cost margins in 
the developing countries in the Latin America. These evidence shows  that each of the main 
reform steps can produce diverse impacts on the price-cost margins and cross-subsidy levels 
across different countries. On the other hand, the overall impacts of reforms on the industrial 
and residential price of electricity depend on the level of industry restructuring.  
The impact of reforms on electricity prices has been less frequently studied on a regional basis 
and the focus of most research to date has been at the utility level. India provides an interesting 
case to assess the differences in regional outcomes of reforms considering the different states 
sharing a common economic and political system. Sen and Jamasb (2012) analyze the impacts 
of individual reform measures on key economic and power sector variables for different Indian 
states and showed that the average price of electricity was unaffected by reforms while passing 
of tariff order in different states as a mechanism to correct price distortions significantly 
lowered the industrial price of electricity. Tariff order also rationalized electricity pricing by 
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lowering the cross-subsidies between industrial and residential customers while unbundling 
lowered the cross-subsidy between industrial and agricultural customers. In Orissa, the average 
electricity tariff increased from 1991 to 2001 (Kundu and Mishra, 2011). However, the price 
of electricity sharply increased particularly for agricultural customers after reforms due to the 
abolishment of government subsidies. These studies confirm that reform outcomes in 
developing countries can be adverse during the initial stages of reforms. 
In Latin America, the change in regulatory regime from cost-based to price-caps did not 
produce clear pattern of electricity price development although the changes in ownership and 
regulatory regime in the electricity distribution sector led to a decline in the retail price in 
general (Estache and Rossi, 2005). The price fall, however, did not match the corresponding 
productivity gains. However, a recent study by Balza, Jimenez and Mercado (2013) 
documented that an increase in cumulative private investment by 1% led to a 0.015% reduction 
in electricity prices across Latin America. The quality of regulation in reforming countries also 
significantly reduced the electricity prices. In Peru, the restructuring and privatization of the 
electricity distribution market led to price increases for consumers (Anaya, 2010). In Argentina, 
the wholesale electricity prices as well as the real average tariffs fell from the 1992 levels as a 
result of increased competition due to industry restructuring and privatization even though the 
price froze in the wake of an economic crisis in 2002 due to the devaluation of the national 
currency (Haselip and Potter, 2010). Average node prices for electricity also declined in Chile 
from the 1982 levels with the implementation of reforms while prices reduced by 30% in 
Argentina (Pollitt, 2004). Nonetheless, assessing the causal effect of the price fall for low-
income groups is complicated in Chile as targeted subsidies and electrification policies can also 
produce the effect rather than strictly privatization (Paredes, 2001). In Colombia, prices 
reduced by 20% (Ayala and Millan, 2003).  
In other developing countries, the impacts of electricity reform on electricity prices are opposite 
of that in Latin American countries. For example in Turkey privatization of electricity 
distribution systems did not yield the expected retail price declines in the initial years of 
reforms program despite the fact that wholesale tariffs exhibited a reduction (retail price 
increased by 6% while wholesale price decreased by 10% (Karahan and Toptas, 2013). 
Similarly, in Africa, electricity prices have been generally high before and after sector reforms.3 
                                                            
3 In most Sub-Saharan African countries, the average electricity tariff remained almost twice as high as in other 
parts of the world regardless of whether this was before or after the reforms. The prevailing high electricity tariffs 
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Reforms also had no impact on the electricity prices of South Asian countries like Bangladesh 
and Pakistan where electricity prices are not cost-reflective and politically determined 
(Bhattacharya, 2007). Electricity prices continue to be below the cost recovery levels giving 
rise to high commercial losses among the transition countries such as Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since reforms started in the early 
1990s (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a). The difficulty of the socially vulnerable consumers to absorb 
further price increases (low affordability) has often prevented pursuing tariff reforms in many 
transition countries (Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007). In Turkey, the introduction of a tariff system 
reflecting costs differently affected the production and consumer prices of electricity. The 
effect on consumer prices was slightly lesser than for producer prices (Akkemik, 2011). 
 
Table 4: Reforms and Electricity Prices 
Study Approach Region Data Method 
Policy impacts 
and relevance 
Nagayama 
(2007) 
econometric global panel data: 83 
countries (26 
developed); 
1985-2002 
 
ordinary 
least squares, 
fixed effects, 
random 
effects 
neither unbundling 
nor introduction of a 
wholesale pool 
market on their own 
necessarily reduces 
the electricity prices; 
unbundling may 
work to reduce prices 
when coexistent with 
an independent 
regulator  
Nagayama 
(2009) 
econometric global panel data: 78 
developing, 
developed and 
transition 
countries; 
1985-2003 
ordered 
response, 
fixed effects, 
random 
effects 
higher electricity 
price drive 
liberalisation; 
liberalisation models 
does not necessarily 
reduce electricity 
price 
Erdogdu 
(2011) 
econometric global panel data: 63 
developed and 
developing 
countries, 
1982-2009 
fixed effects, 
random 
effects 
no uniform pattern 
for the impact of 
reforms process as a 
whole on price-cost 
margins and cross-
subsidy levels; 
                                                            
in these countries do not cover the full costs of electricity supply. Countries like Angola, Malawi, South Africa, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe have maintained highly subsidized low prices below the cost levels (Eberhard et al. 2011). 
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different impact of 
different reform steps 
ESMAP 
(2011) 
econometric global panel data; 20 
countries with 
different 
system sizes 
Fixed effects, 
random 
effects 
vertical unbundling 
reduced electricity 
tariffs by 10 percent 
Sen and 
Jamasb 
(2012) 
econometric India panel data: 19 
Indian states, 
1991-2007 
bias 
corrected 
fixed effects 
political economy 
factors giving rise to 
adverse outcomes in 
the initial stages of 
reforms 
Kundu and 
Mishra 
(2011) 
econometric Indian state 
of Orissa 
survey based 
approach 
partial least 
squares 
some consumers 
group benefited 
(such as industrial) 
while some lost 
(such as agricultural) 
Estache and 
Rossi (2004) 
econometric Latin 
America 
distribution 
companies of 
14 countries,  
correlation fall is prices in 
general did not 
match the 
productivity gains 
Balza, 
Jimenez and 
Mercado 
(2013) 
econometric Latin 
America 
panel data: 18 
countries, 
1971-2010 
generalised 
least squares 
no robust results in 
terms of privatisation 
and end-user-prices; 
strong and robust 
association between 
regulatory quality 
and electricity prices 
Anaya 
(2010) 
cost-benefit 
analysis  
Peru electricity 
distribution 
companies 
(privatised and 
non privatised) 
single 
country 
privatisation 
contributed to price 
increase  
Haselip and 
Potter (2010) 
case study Argentina power sector 
indicators 
single 
country 
reforms led to price 
decline until 
macroeconomic 
crisis 
Pollitt 
(2004) 
case study Chile power sector 
indicators 
single 
country 
average node prices 
declined after 
reforms 
Karahan and 
Toptas 
(2013) 
case study Turkey power sector 
indicators 
single 
country 
no reduction in retail 
electricity prices 
after reforms 
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Eberhard et 
al. (2011) 
case study Africa power sector 
indicators 
multi-
country 
eliminating pricing 
inefficiencies can 
close the funding gap 
in the power sector 
Bhattacharya 
(2007) 
case study South Asia power sector 
indicators 
multi-
country 
reform undertaken 
produced no 
significant results, 
electricity prices still 
highly subsidised  
He et al. 
(2011) 
macro study China coal and 
electricity 
prices 
CGE 
modelling 
coal price increase 
caused a rise in the 
costs of electric 
power industry while 
the influence 
gradually descended 
with increases in coal 
price 
Kennedy 
(2003) 
case study Transition 
economies 
power sector 
indicators 
multi-
country 
implementation of 
reform should be 
enhanced to improve 
reform performance 
Fankhauser 
and Tepic 
(2007) 
case study Transition 
economies 
affordability 
indicators for 
utilities 
multi country level of tariffs 
needed for cost 
recovery bear 
important 
affordability 
consequences 
Akkemik 
(2011) 
case study Turkey macro and 
micro 
variables with 
focus on 
energy 
producing 
sectors 
single 
country; 
social 
accounting 
matrix 
cost reflective 
electricity tariff 
affect consumers 
prices slightly less 
than producer prices 
 
3.1.2. Impacts of reforms on quality of service and access 
One of the principal aims in most reforming countries was to enhance the quality of energy 
supply (Joskow, 1998; Briceno-Garmendia et al., 2004). Reforms were expected to enhance 
energy production, lead to efficient utilisation of existing capacities and add new capacities by 
attracting investments and reduce energy losses. Studies, such as Cubbin and Stern (2004, 
2006), Erdogdu (2014) and Zhang et al. (2008), find that market competition and increased 
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regulatory governance as result of power sector reforms have brought enhanced service 
penetration, generation capacity expansion, utilization of generation capacity and reserve 
margin in some developing countries.  
The effects of reforms on quality and access have differed across different development regions 
as showed by Nagayama (2010) based on econometric methods for panel data analysis. The 
introduction of foreign IPPs when coexistent with independent regulators and unbundling on 
its own increased per capita generation capacity in Asian developing countries while the 
establishment of an independent regulator produced an opposite effect. The per capita 
generation capacity increased among the LACs with the introduction of wholesale power 
market and power exchange. The reform impacts have triggered different impacts on electricity 
transmission and distribution (T&D) losses (Nagayama, 2010). The introduction of foreign 
IPPs decreased T&D losses in Asian developing countries while it had the opposite effect in 
Latin America along with the establishment of an independent sector regulator. The 
introduction of wholesale power market increased T&D losses in Asian developing countries 
as the amount of power traded increased. 
On the other hand, private sector investments in the transmission and distribution networks 
contributed to a decline in electricity losses in Latin America (Balza, Jimenez and Mercado, 
2013). Technical and non-technical losses fell sharply from above 20% in 1992 to just above 
10% in 2007 in Argentina (Pollitt, 2008). The number of minutes of supply interruption per 
year fell to 2.1 in 2003 from 9.6 in 1997 in Chile while distribution losses fell from 19.8% in 
1987 to 5.6% in 2003 (Pollitt, 2004). Generation capacity also increased in many LACs except 
Brazil post reforms (Millan, 2005).  
Reforms triggered different impacts on the plant load factor, T&D losses and gross electricity 
generation among the Indian states (Sen and Jamasb, 2012). Unbundling and tariff orders had 
a positive and significant effect on plant load factors. Introduction of independent regulation, 
unbundling and privatisation of distribution segment contributed to increases in T&D losses. 
Gross electricity generation in India increased with the introduction of the IPPs while 
privatisation of the distribution segment led to decline in electricity distribution losses. The 
average level of T&D losses in Sub-Saharan Africa was around 27.5% in 2009 although the 
system losses substantially ranges from 14.5% in Angola to 68% in Swaziland (ESMAP, 2009). 
Reforms have also been unable to reduce electricity theft in most regions of the developing 
world considering that the quality of governance such as effective accountability, political 
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stability, and government effectiveness and corruption control can reduce energy theft in 
developing countries (Smith, 2004). 
The international experience with electricity restructuring, privatisation and liberalisation has 
exposed the vulnerabilities in electricity supply in various countries (Hall, 1999). For example, 
the end of 1997 saw repeated power cuts in Rio de Janerio, Brazil followed by Buenos Aires, 
Argentina where a 10-day blackout occurred in 1999 while India experienced one of its largest 
blackouts, which affected 20 Indian states in 2012. These supply vulnerabilities coincide with 
the less than anticipated increase in private investments across the electricity networks 
segments (both transmission and distribution) in the electricity industries of developing 
countries with the progress in reforms. In addition, the progress toward electricity sector 
reforms has coincided with limited degree of government support for research and development 
(R&D) activities that potentially threaten the sustainable efficiency improvements in the 
electricity industries of developing countries (Erdogdu, 2013). 
Electricity reforms in developing countries were often mooted with a view to increase access 
across all segments of the population (Sinha, 2003). This is because the participation of the 
private sector in energy production/generation provides more investment to expand the 
electricity supply capacity and thus would enhance access to electricity. However, the available 
evidence suggests that electricity sector reforms do not necessarily accelerate energy access.  
Systematic information is also lacking to indicate an enhanced access of electricity to the poor 
due to the power sector reforms (Prasad, 2008; Haanyika, 2006). For example, the Indian state 
of Orissa, which underwent a deep reform program, experienced a decline in the electrification 
rate after reforms (Sihag et al., 2007). The unaffordability of electricity by the poor also imply 
that any reform initiatives aimed at intensifying rural electrification has little impact in 
improving the energy access of the poor (Bhattacharya, 2006).  
Evidence from Latin American countries suggests that private sector investments, 
improvements in regulatory quality and overall institutional reforms significantly improved the 
electricity coverage in the region (Balza, Jimenez and Mercado, 2013). Electricity coverage 
has been a notable success in South America after reforms where the post-reform electrification 
levels have considerably increased from the pre-reform levels (Kozulj and Di Sbroiavacca, 
2004). For example, the post-reform electrification rates in Argentina, Peru and El Salvador 
respectively increased to 95, 72 and 76% from the respective pre-reform rates of 91, 38 and 
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62%. The number of households without electricity supply in Chile decreased to 14% in 2002 
from 62% in 1982 after reforms (Pollitt, 2004).  
Table 5: Reforms and Electricity Quality/Access 
Study Approach Region Data Method Policy impacts and 
relevance 
Cubbin and 
Stern (2004) 
econometric global panel data: 28 
developing 
countries; 1980-
2001 
OLS, fixed 
effects 
regulatory law and 
governance positively 
related to higher per 
capita electricity 
generation and 
capacity 
Cubbin and 
Stern (2006) 
econometric global panel data: 28 
developing 
countries; 1980-
2001 
fixed 
effects, 
error 
correction 
models 
regulatory law and 
governance positively 
related to higher per 
capita electricity 
capacity controlling 
for privatization and 
competition 
ESMAP 
(2011) 
econometric global panel data; 20 
countries with 
different system 
sizes 
fixed 
effects; 
random 
effects 
introduction of 
independent 
regulation escalated 
access by 50 percent 
Zhang, 
Parker and 
Kirkpatrick 
(2005) 
econometric global panel data: 25 
developing 
countries, 1985-
2001 
fixed 
effects 
independent 
regulation and 
competition before 
privatisation 
important for higher 
electricity generation 
and capacity 
Zhang, 
Parker and 
Kirkpatrick 
(2008) 
econometric global panel data: 51 
developing 
countries, 1985-
2000  
fixed 
effects 
on their own 
privatisation and 
regulation do not lead 
to obvious gains in 
economic 
performance 
Erdogdu 
(2014) 
econometric global panel data: 55 
developed and 
developing 
countries, 1975-
2010  
fixed 
effects, 
random 
effects 
reform progress led to 
higher levels of 
electricity supply self-
sufficiency 
Nagayama 
(2010) 
econometric global panel data: 86 
developed and 
developing 
fixed 
effects 
IPPs, unbundling, 
regulatory agency and 
creating wholesale 
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countries, 1985-
2006  
markets reduced 
transmission and 
distribution losses  
Nepal and 
Jamasb 
(2012a) 
econometric Transition 
economies 
panel data: 27 
countries, 1990-
2010 
bias 
corrected 
fixed 
effects 
power sector reform 
on its own did not 
produce any 
significant impacts on 
T&D losses 
Nepal and 
Jamasb 
(2012b) 
case study Nepal power sector 
indicators 
single 
country 
electricity losses in 
South-Asia including 
Nepal still remain 
high, capacity and 
power shortages 
prevail 
ESMAP 
(2009) 
case study Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
power sector 
indicators 
multi 
country 
high number of 
outages per year and 
long delays with 
electrical connections 
Pollitt (2008) case study Argentina power sector 
indicators 
single 
country 
reforms successful in 
improving quality 
prior to the collapse 
of Argentine peso 
Millan 
(2005) 
case study Latin 
America 
power sector 
indicators 
multi 
country 
generation capacity 
expanded vigorously 
except in Brazil after 
reforms 
Smith (2004) case 
study/econo
metric 
global 102 countries: 
electricity 
losses,  
governance 
indicators for 
1980 and 2000 
correlation/ 
multi 
country 
losses have increased 
in many developing 
countries after 
reforms 
Hall (1999) case study global power sector 
indicators 
multi-
country 
reforms have 
coincided with rising 
power cuts and 
blackouts 
Erdogdu 
(2013) 
econometric global panel data: 27 
countries, 1974-
2008 
fixed 
effects; 
random 
effects 
reform progress led to 
decline in R&D 
investments 
Prasad 
(2008) 
case study Africa energy sector 
indicators 
multi-
country 
energy reforms only 
impacts access when 
adjusted to local 
conditions of the poor 
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Kozulj and 
Sbroiavacca 
(2004) 
case study Latin 
America 
power sector 
indicators 
multi-
country 
electrification levels 
increased after 
reforms 
 
3.1.3. Impacts of reforms on productivity and economic efficiency4 
The changes in energy market structures together with changes in the role of the state and 
regulation of the sector were aimed at improving utility efficiency and productivity levels 
through the introduction of market competition (Wolfram, 1999). The evidence of reforms in 
improving efficiency and productivity in the electricity sector is positive especially in Latin 
America, which also remains the most studied region. However, efficiency and productivity 
impacts of reforms remain least studied in South Asia and Africa. There are only few studies 
analyzing utility efficiency and reforms at the global levels. 
An earlier study by Yunos and Hawdon (1997) found that changes in ownership did not 
automatically resolve efficiency problems in the absence of competition among the least 
developed countries where significant efficiency gaps persisted between small scale and large-
scale electricity providers. Rodriguez-Pardina and Rossi (2000) finds some evidence that 
suggest that countries, which reformed their electricity sector, had a better performance than 
those, which did not. Although technical efficiency among the major electricity distribution 
companies in South America marginally improved between 1994 and 2001, the results 
suggested considerable scope for improving efficiency among the firms (Estache, Rossi and 
Ruzzier, 2004). The increments in productivity seem to be in line with the degree of incentives 
built in regulation while private companies under rate of return regulation exhibited similar 
labor productivity as public firms (Estache and Rossi, 2005).  
The labor productivity in the electricity distribution experienced an increase after reforms in 
Argentina (Pollitt, 2008). Labor productivity in electricity distribution also increased in Chile 
since the privatisation of leading companies (Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra, 2003). The 
incorporation of distribution value added (VAD) in the tariff fixation processes of the electrical 
power distribution contributed to driving the efficiency of the distribution sector in Chile 
(Sanhueza, Rudnick and Lagunas, 2004). In Brazil, privatisation had no statistically significant 
                                                            
4 Economic efficiency is a combination of technical and allocative efficiency (Coelli et al., 2005). Firms operating 
on the production frontier are said to be technically efficient while allocative efficiency in input selection imply 
selecting that mix of inputs (such as labor and capital) that produces a given quantity of output at minimum cost 
(given the input prices which prevail). Productivity of a firm is the ratio of the output(s) that it produces to the 
input(s) that it uses. 
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impact with operating expenditures as input but technically efficiency dropped when 
considering total expenditures (Motta, 2004). This makes case for including capital costs in 
any benchmarking exercise. Overall, the reform processes as well as the incentives generated 
in the reform process in Brazil do not seem to have led the firms to behave in a more efficient 
manner between 1998 and 2005 (Ramos-Real et al., 2009).  
Bonifaz and Santin (2000) found out that privatised firms did not outperform state enterprises 
arguing that privatisation did not lead to an improvement in terms of efficiency among Peruvian 
electricity distribution companies. The post reform experience suggested insufficient evidence 
for technical change or significant savings associated with technological improvements in the 
sector (Bonifaz and Rodriguez, 2001). Improvements in efficiency and productivity of 
electricity distribution in Peru have occurred with the adoption of regulatory reforms in the 
Peruvian electricity sector although privatisation proved to be advantageous only in the initial 
years after the reform (Perez-Reyes and Tovar, 2010). There seem to be a positive relationship 
between the restructuring and reforms of the electricity distribution sector and enhancement of 
productivity in Peru (Perez-Reyes and Tovar, 2009). Management practices seem to be 
important in the Peruvian electricity distribution due to which private utilities are less 
inefficient than public utilities (Bonifaz and Jaramillo, 2010). 
In Colombia, reforms of the 1990s seem to have improved the average efficiency levels of 
electricity distribution with regulatory policy engendering a positive effect while ownership 
has produced no conclusive effect (Pombo and Ramirez, 2002a). Technological improvements 
and regulatory policy have had a positive effect on average efficiency but the divide between 
good performers and bad performers increased after reforms (Pombo and Ramirez, 2002b). 
Mello and Espinoza (2004) found no significant changes in the productivity levels among the 
20 distribution companies between 1993 and 2003, although environmental variables mattered 
significantly. In contrast, Pombo and Taborda (2006) showed that plant efficiency and 
productivity increased after the regulatory reform of 1994 although the efficiency of 
distribution companies did not improve after the reforms. Nonetheless, the Colombian 
electricity distribution exhibits high inefficiency persistence and heterogeneity among firms 
(Galan and Pollitt, 2014). Rural companies and firms with small customers seem to have 
experienced the largest efficiency gains over the 15 years after the reforms. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the results obtained from the efficiency analysis of the Côte d’voire 
electricity companies could not reject the hypothesis of a significant performance improvement 
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in post-privatization period while the technical efficiency measures have behaved irregularly 
since privatization (Plane, 1999). Meanwhile, Estache et al. (2008) attempted at documenting 
efficiency levels in Africa's electricity firms based on a sample of 12 operators providing 
services in the 12 country members of the Southern Africa Power Pool. The study relied on the 
DEA decomposition technique to estimate the changes in total factor productivity (TFP). The 
results showed comparable levels of efficiency and performance levels in the region while 
finding no clear correlation of efficiency improvements with the adoption of reforms.  
A number of studies have focused on efficiency and productivity analysis of electricity reforms 
in the transition economies of Eastern Europe. The efficiency analysis based on the Ukrainian 
privately and publicly-owned electricity distribution firms in the context of a new regulatory 
authority and distribution utility privatisations suggested that privately-owned firms responded 
to policies and incentives associated with reducing commercial and non-commercial network 
losses than publicly owned firms (Berg et al., 2005). In Poland, technical efficiency among the 
electricity distribution companies increased during the transition process while allocative 
efficiency deteriorated (Cullman and von Hirschhausen, 2008a). The cross-country level 
analysis suggested that the Polish ddistribution companies were marginally inefficient while 
the Czech Republic featured the highest efficiency (Cullman and von Hirschhausen, 2008b). 
Slovakia and Hungary occupied the middle range. This implies that privatization had a positive 
effect on technical efficiency in all four countries. The average efficiency of thermal generation 
plants also grew in China as autonomy from the central government was one of the important 
determinants of efficiency (Lam and Shiu, 2004). In Turkey, private distributors had better 
technical scale efficiency on average during the early years of reforms (Bagdadioglu et al., 
1996; Celen, 2013).  
A limited number of studies have been carried out to assess the efficiency and productivity of 
electricity reforms in developing Asian countries. The performance and efficiency analysis of 
Indian electricity generation companies supported the policy of unbundling the power sector 
while state owned companies appeared inefficient (Jain et al., 2010). However, privatisation 
brought about different impacts among employees productivity in the state of Orissa as some 
employees felt benefits while others did not (Kundu and Mishra, 2012). In contrast, technical 
performance in the Thai electricity industry was found to be mainly driven by technological 
and productivity improvements (Wattana and Sharma, 2011). In the Philippines, productivity 
in the sector did not improve significantly despite reforms being instituted in 2001 (Bautista et 
al., 2011). Similarly, the empirical analysis by Nakano and Managi (2008) showed that 
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regulatory reforms have contributed to productivity growth in steam power-generation sector 
in Japan for the period 1978-2003. Deregulation of the Japanese power industry also 
contributed to productivity growth (Goto and Sueyoshi, 2009). In China, unbundling of the 
integrated electricity utility-the State Power Corporation (SPC) improved productivity and 
operational efficiency among the large coal-fired power plants controlling for substantial 
heterogeneity in the technical profile of the plants (Zhao and Ma, 2013). 
 
Table 6: Reforms and Efficiency and Productivity 
Study Approach Region Data Method Policy impacts and relevance 
Pollitt 
(1995) 
non-
parametric 
global 768 thermal 
plants from 14 
countries 
including South 
Africa and 
Thailand 
DEA with 2nd 
stage 
regressions 
/Tobit 
privatisation did 
not lower costs in 
the short run, 
government 
interference with 
investment 
increase costs  
Yunos and 
Hawdon 
(1997) 
non-
parametric 
least 
developing 
countries 
cross-section 
generation data 
for 27 countries, 
panel of 
electricity 
generating 
utilities from 
Malaysia, 
Thailand and the 
UK for 1975-
1990 
DEA changes in 
ownership do not 
resolve efficiency 
problems in the 
absence of 
competition, 
efficiency gaps 
between small 
scale and large 
scale providers  
Rodriguez-
Pardina and 
Rossi (2000) 
parametric South 
America 
30 electricity 
distribution 
companies from 
10 countries 
1994-1998 
stochastic 
production 
function 
partial evidence of 
reformers 
performing better 
than non-
reformers 
Estache, 
Rossi and 
Ruzzier 
(2004) 
parametric/ 
non-
parametric 
Latin 
America 
84 electricity 
distribution 
companies 1994-
2001 
stochastic cost 
function, 
DEA, labor 
requirement 
function 
technical 
efficiency 
marginally 
improved but 
scope for 
efficiency 
improvement 
exists 
Estache and 
Rossi (2005) 
parametric Latin 
America 
127 distribution 
companies 1994-
2001 
stochastic 
production 
function/labor 
incentives in 
embedded in 
regulation crucial 
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requirement 
function 
for productivity 
increases 
ESMAP 
(2011) 
parametric global distribution 
companies from 
20 countries with 
different system 
sizes  
fixed effects; 
random effects 
Introduction of 
independent 
regulator increased 
labor productivity 
by twice as high as 
systems that have 
introduced 
regulation 
Sanhueza, 
Rudnick and 
Lagunas 
(2004) 
non-
parametric 
Chile 35 distribution 
companies for the 
year 2000 
DEA incorporating 
distribution VAD 
led to 
improvements in 
efficiency 
Malik et al. 
(2015) 
parametric India unbalanced panel 
of  385 electricity 
generating units 
for the years 
1998-2009 
panel data 
econometric 
based in fixed 
effects 
states unbundling 
before the 
Electricity Act of 
2003 experienced 
improvements in 
operational 
efficiency 
especially after 3-5 
years after 
unbundling 
Motta (2004) parametric/
non-
parametric 
Brazil distribution 
companies 1994 
and 2000 
DEA/Stochasti
c production 
frontier 
Privatisation has 
no effect on 
operating cost 
efficiency, makes 
case for including 
capital costs in 
benchmarking 
Ramos-Real 
et al. (2009) 
non-
parametric 
Brazil panel of 18 
distribution 
companies from 
1998-2005 
DEA incentives 
generated in the 
reforms process 
incapable of 
making firms 
behave in more 
efficient manner 
Bonifaz and 
Santin 
(2000) 
non-
parametric 
Peru panel of 19 
distribution 
operators 1995-
1998 
DEA with 2nd 
stage 
regressions 
privatisation did 
not lead to an 
improvement in 
terms of efficiency 
Bonifaz and 
Jaramillo 
(2010) 
parametric Peru panel of 19 
distribution 
companies for the 
period 2000-2008 
stochastic cost 
frontier 
private utilities are 
less inefficient 
than public 
utilities due to 
better management 
practices 
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Perez-Reyes 
and Tovar 
(2009) 
non-
parametric 
Peru 14 distribution 
companies for the 
period 1996-2006 
DEA reforms led to 
improvements in 
efficiency and 
productivity 
Perez-Reyes 
and Tovar 
(2010) 
parametric Peru 14 distribution 
companies 
between 1996 and 
2006 
distance 
function 
incentives lead by 
the reform process 
made firms more 
efficient 
Pombo and 
Ramirez 
(2002a) 
non-
parametric 
Colombia panel of 33 
distribution 
companies from 
1988-2000 
DEA with 2nd 
stage 
regression 
reforms improved 
average efficiency 
levels 
Pombo and 
Ramirez 
(2002b) 
non-
parametric 
Colombia panel of 33 
generation and 12 
distribution 
companies 1988-
2000 
DEA with 2nd 
stage 
regression 
technology 
improvements and 
regulatory policy 
had positive effect 
on average 
efficiency levels 
Mello and 
Espinoza 
(2004) 
parametric Colombia panel of 20 
distribution 
companies 1999-
2003 
Free Disposal 
Hull (FDH) 
environmental 
variables mattered 
significantly 
Galan and 
Pollitt 
(2014) 
parametric Colombia panel of 21 
electricity 
distribution firms 
for the period 
1998-2012 
dynamic SFA 
model 
increases in 
efficiency among 
rural firms only 
manifested during 
the last five years 
driven by 
improvements in 
service quality and 
energy losses 
occured 
Plane (1999) parametric Côte 
d’Ivoire 
time-series from 
1959-1995 
stochastic 
production 
function 
significant but 
irregular gains 
from the 
privatization of 
management 
Estache, 
Tovar and 
Trujillo 
(2008) 
non-
parametric 
Southern 
African 
countries 
12 operators of 12 
different 
countries, 1998-
2005 
DEA no clear 
correlation 
between between 
adoption of 
reforms and 
improvements in 
efficiency 
Berg, Lin 
and Tsaplin 
(2005) 
parametric/
non-
parametric 
Ukraine 24 distribution 
companies, 1998-
2002 
stochastic 
production 
frontier/DEA 
private operators 
responded well to 
incentives than 
public operators, 
perverse 
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regulation worsens 
incentives 
Cullman and 
von 
Hirschhause
n (2008a) 
parametric/
non-
parametric 
Poland 32 distribution 
companies 
between 1997 to 
2002 
DEA/SFA technical 
efficiency 
improved with 
reforms but 
allocative 
efficiency 
deteriorated 
Cullman and 
von 
Hirschhause
n (2008b) 
non-
parametric 
Poland, 
Czech 
Republic, 
Slovakia, 
Hungary 
47 Eastern 
European regional 
companies, 37 
German 
companies 
DEA/Free 
Disposal Hall  
Czech Republic 
and Slovakia 
feature the highest 
efficiency, 
privatisation had a 
positive effect in 
all countries 
Lam and 
Shiu (2004) 
non-
parametric 
China panel of 30 
municipal 
autonomous 
regions and 
provincial thermal 
generation plants 
1995-1996 
DEA with 2nd 
stage 
regressions 
average efficiency 
increased at 2% 
Bagdadioglu
, Price and 
Weyman 
Jones (1996) 
non-
parametric 
Turkey cross section of 
70 distribution 
operators in 1991 
DEA Private operators 
are more efficient 
than public 
operators 
Celen (2013) non-
parametric 
Turkey 21 companies for 
the period 2002-
2009 
DEA with 2nd 
stage 
regression/Tob
it 
private ownership 
positively affect 
efficiencies 
Jain, Thakur 
and 
Shandilya 
(2010) 
parametric/
non-
parametric 
India 30 state –owned 
utilities for the 
year 2007-2008 
DEA/SFA unbundling drives 
efficiency in 
electricity 
generation 
Wattana and 
Sharma 
(2011) 
non-
parametric 
Thailand Thai electric 
industry, time 
series data from 
1980-2006  
DEA industry reforms 
not significant in 
driving efficiency 
Bautista, 
Agnes and 
Valderrama 
(2011) 
non-
parametric 
Philippines 120 electric 
cooperatives, 
2001 to 2006 
DEA reforms did not 
drive productivity 
in the sector 
Nakano and 
Managi 
(2008) 
parametric/ 
non-
parametric 
Japan 10 companies, 
1965-2003 
DEA/ 
generalised 
method of 
moments 
regulatory reforms 
have contributed 
to productivity 
growth in the 
steam power-
generation 
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Goto and 
Sueyoshi 
(2009) 
parametric Japan annual 
observations in 9 
companies from 
1983-2003 
multi-product 
translog cost 
function, 
random effects 
maximum 
likelihood 
estimator 
improvements in 
productivity 
growth after 
deregulation 
Pombo and 
Taborda 
(2006) 
non-
parametric 
Colombia 12 electricity 
distribution 
companies from 
1985 to 2001 
DEA profitability, 
partial input 
productivity, and 
output improved; 
plant efficiency 
and productivity 
increased after the 
reform 
Zhao and 
Ma (2013) 
non-
parametric 
China balanced panel: 
34 large power 
plants for the 
period 1997-2010 
DEA Operation 
efficiency 
improved on 
average, 
unbundling 
boosted 
productivity  
 
3.2. Macroeconomic Impacts of Electricity Sector Reforms 
In this section, we review the relevant literature analyzing the impacts of electricity sector 
reforms on macroeconomic indicators such as economic welfare, economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Electricity is one of the main inputs to economic growth especially in developing 
countries where economic development is constraint due to lack of infrastructure including 
reliable supply of electricity. Therefore, any programs and policies that relax the electricity 
supply constraints are expected to generate positive impacts on economic welfare and growth 
and also reduce poverty. In this section we present some evidence to support this argument.  
3.2.1. Impacts of reforms on economic welfare 
The economy-wide welfare impacts of power sector reforms are reported by a few studies. 
Galal et al. (1994) that estimated the welfare impacts of the privatisation of the Chilean 
distribution and generation companies, is one of the first and most comprehensive studies 
assessing welfare implications of power sector reforms. The privatisation of the Chilean 
electricity companies (an electricity distribution and a power generation) led to a permanent 
gain in social welfare equivalent to 2.1% of 1986 sales value. However, the gains were achieved 
at a fiscal loss and two-thirds of the aggregate gains went to foreign shareholders. In Brazil, 
the privatization of the electricity distribution during the period 1995-2000 when 
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approximately 60% of privatisation occurred created a one-off gain equal to 2.5% of the GDP 
while producers gain around two-thirds of the benefits (Mota, 2003). Consumers could have 
benefited more from privatization since the start the presence of tougher regulation. The 
economic welfare impacts of partial privatization and restructuring of the Peruvian electricity 
market also proved worthwhile as the gains amounted to 542 million US dollars in 2007 prices 
(Anaya, 2010). The distributional gains suggested that government and producers benefited the 
most from welfare gains while consumers benefited the least.  
Toba (2007) studied the welfare impacts of introduction of private sector participation into the 
Philippine electricity generation sector, through liberalization of the market for IPPs during the 
power crisis of 1990-1993. The introduction of IPPs presented significant gains contributing to 
resolving the crisis and promoting economic and social development while consumers and 
investors were net gainers. However, only about one-quarter of the total private investors’ gain 
is transferred to the domestic investors, as most of the investors are assumed to be foreigners. 
The largest portion of the net benefit equivalent to a net present value of 10.4 billion US dollars 
(in 1999 prices) was distributed to consumers while both domestic and foreign investors also 
gained. The government was the loser. In Israel, Tisher et al. (2006) undertook a cost-benefit 
analysis summarizing the government's reform plan using an unregulated regime as the 
counterfactual. The results suggested that the government's reform plan would only yield a 
small net benefit even when carried out flawlessly relative to the regulated regime. The reforms 
will also lead to large increases in electricity producer profit and government tax receipts at the 
expense of the electricity consumers. As such, a less-than-perfect transition to competition 
could easily preclude the potential gain of the government plan. 
 
Table 7: Reforms and Economic Welfare 
Study Approach Region Data Method Policy impacts and relevance 
Galal et al. 
(1994) 
multi-
country case 
studies 
global public 
enterprises 
divestitures in 
UK, Chile, 
Malaysia and 
Mexico; analyses 
the privatisation 
of the power 
sector in Chile 
social cost-
benefit 
analysis 
privatisation when 
combined with 
proper regulatory 
framework can be 
welfare enhancing,  
private ownership 
improves efficiency 
of generation, 
promote profit 
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maximisation and 
increases the value of 
regulation 
Mota (2003) single 
country case 
study 
Brazil privatisation of 
electricity 
distribution and 
supply 
businesses 
between 1995-
2000 
social cost-
benefit 
analysis 
economic welfare 
(net benefits) was 
significant but most 
of it went to the 
producers; 
consumers could 
have benefited more 
from privatisation in 
the presence of 
tougher regulation 
Anaya 
(2010) 
single 
country case 
study 
Peru privatisation of 
electricity 
distribution 
companies: 
Electrolima and 
Electro Sur 
Medio   
social cost-
benefit 
analysis 
privatisation was 
worthwhile in terms 
of social welfare, 
government and 
producers benefited 
the most while 
consumers the least 
due to price increases 
Toba (2007) single 
country case 
study 
Philippines liberalisation of 
the electricity 
generation sector 
between 1990-
1993 
social cost- 
benefit 
analysis 
consumers and 
investors were net 
gainers while the 
government lost, 
reform with private 
sector participation 
increased economic 
welfare 
Tishler et al. 
(2006) 
single 
country case 
study 
Israel in accordance to 
the 2003 Israeli 
government 
announcement to 
undertake a 
comprehensive 
reform of the 
electricity sector 
based on the 
standard reform 
model 
cost-benefit 
analysis 
the reform plan will 
only yield a small net 
benefit even when 
carried out 
flawlessly, will 
increase the profit for 
producers and tax 
receipts for the 
government at the 
expense of 
customers, 
performance-based 
regulation of the 
sector thereby is 
desirable 
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3.2.2. Impacts of reforms on economic growth 
A few studies have provided evidence of positive impacts of power sector reforms on economic 
growth. For example, Sen and Jamasb (2012) empirically show the increased stock of 
electricity infrastructure has made a significant contribution to its industrial economic output 
Existing literature such as Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2010) also establish the positive relationship between stock (as well as quality) of 
infrastructure and per capita GDP growth. 
Empirical evidence also suggests a strong positive link between regulatory quality in all 
economic sectors and economic performance such as economic growth in developing countries 
(Jalilian, Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2007).  Electricity reforms can stimulate economic growth by 
improving access to electricity and electricity consumption (Ozturk, 2010). However, only a 
few studies have directly examined whether energy sector reforms serve as the determinants of 
economic growth where per capita GDP and overall employment are used as an indicators of 
economic growth. 
Nepal and Jamasb (2012a) examined the impact of power sector reforms on per capita GDP in 
the transition countries which predominantly includes countries belonging to the Former Soviet 
Union. The empirical results show significant positive impacts of reforms on GDP. The results 
also hold for the growing Indian economy as evidenced from the empirical results by Sen and 
Jamasb (2012). Their study econometrically analyzed the determinants and impact of 
electricity reform in the Indian states, giving special regard to its political economy and 
regional diversity.  
Chisari et al. (1999) estimated the macroeconomic effects of the privatisation and regulation of 
utilities including the energy sector that began since 1989 in Argentina. The privatization of 
electricity generation and distribution and gas all had positive effect on GDP. The privatisation 
of the gas sector had the greatest effect on GDP amounting to 0.31% rise in GDP in the presence 
of good regulation. Privatization of energy utilities did not contribute to the dramatic rise in 
unemployment between 1993 and 1995. The fiscal consequences of privatization and 
regulation of infrastructure utilities including energy suggested that the country gained more 
in macroeconomic terms from the net present value of subsidy cuts (Benitez et al., 2001). 
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Reallocating the resources freed up by energy subsidies removal to more productive public 
spending can help boost economic growth over the long run (IMF, 2013) 
Table 8: Reforms and Economic Growth 
Study Approach Region Data Method Policy impacts and 
relevance 
Chisari, 
Estache and 
Romero 
(1999) 
macro study Argentina performance 
data before and 
after 
privatisation of 
the argentine 
utilities 
CGE model privatisation resulted in 
different kinds of 
efficiency gains with 
significant macro-
economic benefits, 
privatisation not the 
cause for rising 
unemployment 
IMF (2013) case study global energy and 
economy level 
data 
multi-
country 
subsidies removal boost 
economic growth in the 
long run 
Benitez, 
Chisari and 
Estache 
(2001) 
macro study Argentina privatisation, 
fiscal reforms 
and regulation 
data 
CGE country gained more 
from subsidy cuts and 
reforms and 
privatisation of energy 
utilities not responsible 
for increased 
unemployment 
Nepal and 
Jamasb 
(2012a) 
econometric transition 
economies 
panel data: 27 
countries, 1990-
2010 
bias 
corrected 
fixed effects 
power sector reform on 
its own did not produce 
any significant impacts 
on T&D losses 
Sen and 
Jamasb 
(2012) 
econometric India panel data: 19 
Indian states, 
1991-2007 
bias 
corrected 
fixed effects 
reforms positively 
affected the GDP 
 
3.2.3. Impacts of reforms on poverty alleviation 
Existing literature on infrastructure reforms and poverty linkages shows that policy changes to 
improve the access and quality of infrastructure services help reduce poverty through direct 
and indirect channels, such as providing more opportunities to generate income, improving 
health and educational outcomes (Estache and Fay, 1995; Brenneman and Kerf, 2002). Hence, 
power sector reforms aimed at improving the access and supply reliability contributes to 
poverty reduction. However, existing studies have not empirically examined this issue and 
explored the evidence to investigate this hypothesis. In fact, some studies examining this issue 
36 
 
empirically (e.g., Victor, 2005) found no inherent connection between energy markets reforms 
and the promotion of welfare for the poorest households although energy consumption and 
economic growth are correlated.  
The extent to which power sector reform affects poor people primarily depends on their ability 
to access electricity. For example, energy poor also tend to be income poor as evidenced from 
India establishing a clear link between income poverty and energy poverty (Khandker, Barnes, 
Samad, 2012a). Rural electrification also helped reduce poverty in India even though the larger 
share of benefits accrued to wealthier rural households (Khandker et al., 2012). In addition, 
grid electrification in Bangladesh generated significant positive impacts on household income, 
expenditure and education where the household gain in total income due to electrification was 
around 21%, with a 1.5 percentage point reduction in poverty per year (Khandker et al., 2012b). 
Similarly, access to communal grid electricity generated externality benefits for the poor than 
the rich in Vietnam while access to household electricity benefited the rich than poor 
questioning the rural electrification’s long term benefits for the overall rural economy 
(Khandker, Barnes and Samad, 2013).  
The efficiency gains from privatization of energy utilities in Argentina accrued mostly to high-
income classes, while gains from the effective regulation of newly privatized utilities accrued 
mainly to low-income classes (Chisari et al., 1999). All income groups benefited from reforms 
while the distribution of income also improved (Navajas, 2000). In general, incidences of final 
electricity price fall were experienced post reforms in Latin America although the price fall did 
not translate into increased affordability and access to electricity to the poor households. The 
electric utilities and the governments shared most of the gains in the form of rents and higher 
tax revenue (Estache and Rossi, 2004). In Peru, electricity consumers, which constitute the 
majority of the population, benefited the least from reforms as welfare gains were offset by 
increases in prices (Anaya, 2010). Nonetheless, the welfare consequences of getting connected 
to electricity networks are high.  
Some studies have examined distributional impacts of some components of power sector 
reforms, such as electricity pricing reforms. Boccanfuso et al. (2009a) assess the distributional 
effects of electricity pricing reform in Senegal. The analysis found that increases in electricity 
prices bear little direct impact on most poor households as only few poor households are 
connected to network. Compensating measures such as cash transfers in the face of electricity 
price increase slightly decreases income inequality between poor and rich households. Similar 
effects were observed regarding the distributional and poverty-related effects of price reform 
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in the electricity sector of Mali, a poor country in West Africa (Boccanfuso et al., 2009b). The 
increase in electricity prices did not affect poverty directly as very few poor households are 
connected to the electricity grid while households also decrease their electricity consumption 
when price rises. Unlike in Senegal, compensating measures such as cash transfer after price 
rise did not help the low-income households losing from pricing reform. Based on the broad 
trends of energy reforms across the African countries, Clark et al. (2005) show that the impacts 
of reforms on the poor are neither direct nor inevitable. 
 
Table 9: Reforms and Poverty Reduction 
Study Approach Region Data Method 
Policy impacts and 
relevance 
Victor 
(2005) 
case study global energy sector 
indicators 
multi-
country 
energy access and 
development correlated; 
link between reforms and 
poverty reduction 
complex and non-
inherent 
Khandker, 
Barnes and 
Samad 
(2012a) 
econometric India cross-sectional 
survey data for 
households in 
2005 
probit 
estimates 
energy poverty and 
income poverty are 
directly linked to each 
other 
Khandker, 
Barnes and 
Samad 
(2012b) 
econometric Bangladesh cross-sectional 
survey data for 
households in 
2005 
propensit
y score 
matching 
electrification led to 
household gains in 
income and poverty 
reduction 
Khandker et 
al. (2012) 
econometric India cross-sectional 
survey data for 
households in 
2005 
maximum 
likelihood 
probit 
model 
rural electrification also 
helped reduce poverty; 
larger share of benefits 
accrued to wealthier rural 
households 
Boccanfuso, 
Estache and 
Savard 
(2009a) 
macro study Senegal macro –micro 
variables 
between 1995 
to 2001 
CGE 
model 
direct price effects are 
weaker than general 
equilibrium effects on 
poverty and inequality 
Boccanfuso, 
Estache and 
Savard 
(2009b) 
macro study Mali macro –micro 
variables  
CGE 
model 
direct price increases 
have a minimal effect on 
poverty and inequality, 
whereas the general 
equilibrium effects of 
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such increases are quite 
strong and negative 
Clark et al. 
(2005) 
case study Africa energy sector 
indicators, 
macro 
variables 
multi-
country 
impacts of reforms on 
the poor are neither 
direct nor inevitable 
Betily, 
Movchan 
and 
Pugachov 
(2013 
macro study Ukraine household 
survey data for 
2009 
CGE 
model 
increases in gas prices 
result in welfare losses 
across all household 
categories, with a more 
profound impact on 
urban households 
Solaymani, 
Kari and 
Zakaria(201
3) 
macro study Malaysia time series 
macro and 
micro data 
CGE 
model 
subsidy removal can 
potentially lead to 
significant falls in 
income of rural 
households leading to 
rising poverty levels 
among the rural 
households 
ADB (2005) case study Asia macro-micro 
data 
multi-
country 
strong links between 
investments in energy 
infrastructure and rural 
poverty reduction in 
Thailand and India 
Estache, 
Foster and 
Wodon 
(2002) 
case study Latin 
America 
macro-micro 
variables 
multi-
country 
evidence of reforms on 
poverty reduction is 
scarce; hence the 
analysis remain 
incomplete 
 
4. Discussions and Policy Implications 
A review of the limited literature and evidence on the impacts of electricity sector reforms 
suggests a growing trend in this research area among the developing and transition countries. 
The existing reform studies have used both quantitative and qualitative techniques to assess the 
impact of reforms with no strict preference over one another. Latin America remains the most 
studied region in the reform literature for two major reasons: a) being one of the pioneers of 
the market-driven electricity reforms and b) the ability of the Latin American Association of 
Energy Regulators to generate comparable data.  
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The reform studies have analysed one or many dimensions of reforms involving changes in 
electricity market structures, regulation of the sector and changing role of the state on several 
industry specific micro and economy specific macro variables. The evidence on the 
performance of reforms remains mixed in developing countries for varied reasons. For 
example, the mixed results indicate that reforms have not progressed, stalled or recently 
initiated to produce the intended economic effects in many developing countries. Additionally, 
even if reforms have advanced, they remain so only in theory such that existing reform practices 
are incapable of producing real impacts. The reform measures among selective samples may 
also be inadequate to recognize significant effects while undertaking quantitative (mostly 
econometric) studies.  
Moreover, the mixed results and evidence also reflect the difficulty of undertaking any 
empirical studies on the performance and determinants of electricity reforms. The reliability of 
econometric results analysing the effects of reforms often hinges on the availability of a data 
sample that captures a mix of reform experiences. Electricity reforms and performance data 
tend to suffer from endogeneity and simultaneity bias. Establishing the effects of reforms 
typically involve correcting for country or utility specific factors other than reforms but robust 
evidences are neither guaranteed nor certain. This is because of reforms being multi-
dimensional involves a number of simultaneous inter-related steps affected by a vector of 
political, economic and institutional factors that are difficult to quantify. These factors make it 
difficult to isolate the effects of particular reform steps or interaction of different reform steps 
on specific reform outcomes. 
The issue of cost-reflective pricing remains at the heart of the success or failure of the reforms. 
Reforms led to cost-reflective electricity pricing in some countries in Latin America by 
decreasing the price-cost margin. In the absence of market power abuse and exercise, reforms 
also led a decline in average wholesale electricity prices but not necessarily the retail prices. 
Privatization, however, raised the electricity prices allowing the governments and producers to 
gain from the price rise while affecting the consumers. The existence of an independent 
regulator and institutional quality seem to facilitate the transition to cost-reflective power 
pricing and mitigate adverse impacts of price increases. Hence, electricity price adjustments 
should be undertaken before privatization rather than after privatization to minimize the 
tension between economic efficiency and equity if privatization of the energy companies is 
considered as an option for reform in developing countries. The existence of cross-subsidies 
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and subsidies for rural electrification in developing countries implies that it is also hard to 
separate the price only impacts of reforms. 
In many developing countries, reforms have led to improvements in operational efficiency of 
the sector by minimizing energy losses, increasing energy production and energy capacities. 
For example, the liberalized electricity market model in South America has been relatively 
successful in attracting investments in generation than the dominant single-buyer model in 
South Asia. However, power theft still remains common in developing and transition countries 
despite reforms. This implies that establishing social legitimacy and public acceptance of 
reforms are crucial in tackling the traditional problems of non-commercial energy losses 
(energy theft) and non-payment of energy in developing countries. One possible way to 
increase the social legitimacy and public acceptance of reforms is by implementing reform 
programs that adequately reflect the local economic, political and social conditions rather than 
solely relying on international reform ideologies. 
The issue of service quality is mostly associated with the access to energy in developing 
countries with reforms generating varying impacts. For example, the adoption of market-based 
reforms in Latin America coincided with an expansion in rural electricity access programs as 
opposed to countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa where the lack of electricity access 
in rural areas remains a national problem. In contrast, South Africa achieved higher 
electrification without implementing the textbook reform model. The evidence suggests that 
reforms, if undertaken, alone cannot solve the problems of inadequate access to electricity 
in developing countries in the absence of other complementary socio-economic 
arrangements. The existence of side arrangements implies that it is hard to measure the direct 
impacts of reforms on rural electricity access. Nonetheless, reforms have helped exposing the 
issue of inadequate rural energy access as major impediments to socio-economic progress in 
developing countries.  
Reforms (mainly privatization and regulation) seem to have largely improved the cost 
efficiency of electricity utilities in many developing countries. Energy sectors in these countries 
witnessed major efficiency gains. In that sense, reforms seem to have fulfilled one of its major 
objectives. However, the gains have not trickled down to the end-users of energy. Evidence 
suggests that consumers benefited from efficiency gains from privatization in the presence of 
a good regulatory body while regulators with perverse incentives exacerbated the matter. The 
inability of the sector regulators to transfer the efficiency gains achieved through reforms to 
end users through market-based instruments (such as incentive regulation) has led to reforms 
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being unpopular and negative.   From a consumer-welfare perspective, the lessons of 
experience suggest the need to create an independent and competent regulatory body before 
privatization of electricity utilities.  
Reforms, if carried out properly, enhance economic welfare as documented from the lessons 
of experience. However, reforms alone are incapable of creating an equitable distribution of 
welfare among different income groups. The welfare gains from privatization mostly went to 
both domestic and foreign-owned producers in many instances. Experiences document that the 
welfare gains from privatisation would have benefited consumers more in the presence of a 
tougher regulation. The importance of a proper regulatory framework in maintaining a 
balance between welfare maximization and equity considerations is paramount in developing 
countries.  
The impact of electricity sector reforms on economic growth is positive. This is not surprising 
when macroeconomic conditions have often catapulted energy reform in many developing 
countries. Privatization, if pursued with economic motives, seems to be conducive in 
macroeconomic terms. However, removal of energy subsidies seems to generate contractionary 
effects on the economy in the short-run although the long-term effects are positive. Hence, 
energy subsidies reform in developing countries should be appropriately phased, well 
targeted and transparent while the corresponding prices increases should be sequential and 
not abrupt to maintain economic growth both in the short-term and long run.  
The link between electricity sector reforms and poverty reduction remain in-direct, complex 
and hard to quantify. Evidence suggests a correlation between electricity access and 
development in developing countries implying that reforms affect poverty in developing 
countries through access to electricity. For example, the access to electricity in rural 
Bangladesh increased the welfare of the poor and helped reduce poverty as well. This implies 
that at a minimum, reforms should be aimed at catering the electricity to the poor to produce 
any significant impacts on poverty reduction in developing countries. This indeed is a major 
challenge considering the costs involved in expanding energy access. For example, it is 
estimated that the investment cost of providing electricity to Sub-Saharan Africa over a 10-
year period is between 160 billion and 215 billion U.S. dollars (Rosnes and Vennemo, 2012). 
At the same time, it also provides an opportunity to reform the lives of the poor and establish 
the legacy of market driven reforms in developing countries.  
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5. Conclusions 
This paper reviewed the empirical and theoretical literature on the linkages between electricity 
reforms; economic and technical efficiency, operational performance, economic growth, 
economic welfare and poverty reduction in developing countries. The paper achieved this by 
understanding the context and motivation of energy reforms, reviewing the progress and 
assessing the factors that shaped the outcomes of reforms, measuring reform performance, 
exploring the theory and practice of electricity reforms and formulating policy lessons based 
on the performance of reforms in developing countries. The extent of reforms has varied across 
developing countries in terms of changes in market structures, the role of the state and the 
regulation of the sector. 
Existing literature suggests that assessing the impacts of electricity reforms has heavily 
focussed on measuring the operational and economic efficiency and productivity impacts of 
the reforms. However, the literature studying the macro linkages of the reforms seems scarce. 
The impact of reforms on the poor is also limited and hard to quantify. Hence, examining the 
impact of power sector reforms on factors directly affecting poor people was a challenge of the 
study. The incompleteness of reforms and the interplay among several indirect factors (such as 
economic, political and institutional) compounds the challenge of properly measuring the 
reform impacts of individual reform steps.  
Overall, from the literature, it is evident that reforms have improved the efficiency and 
productivity in the sector, although the efficiency gains may not always reach the end 
consumers. The existence of an independent regulatory body with tougher regulation is 
necessary in developing countries to transfer the efficiency gains to the customers and ensure 
that not only producers and the government benefit from privatization. Reforms seem to 
generate poverty alleviation impacts only when the poor have access to electricity. This implies 
that reforms should be localized with a view to meet the electricity needs of the poor, which 
can potentially enhance the welfare of the poor. However, there is a consensus in the literature 
that the regulatory framework at disposal and the nature of regulation are crucial in balancing 
the tension between economic efficiency and equity impacts of reforms. 
We also found several caveats in the existing reform literature, which future research can 
potentially address. The welfare analysis of reforms using cost-benefit analysis remains limited 
in the context of developing countries. The impacts of reforms on electricity network 
investments are also unclear and under-studied.  The competitiveness of wholesale markets and 
43 
 
market power issues also remain to be studied in developing countries in the aftermath of 
reforms. The existing literature on the empirical evidence of reforms focuses mostly on the 
electricity sector. Similar studies should be extended to other energy sectors such as coal, oil 
and gas by facilitating information and data sharing among the energy regulators.  
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